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Public sector corruption and the probability of 
technological disasters  
 
 
 
Abstract. A growing number of works have explored the influence of institution on 
the outcomes of disasters and accidents from the viewpoint of political economy. 
This paper focuses on the probability of the occurrence of disasters rather than 
disaster outcomes. Using panel data from 98 countries, this paper examines how 
public sector corruption is associated with the probability of technological disasters. 
It was found that public sector corruption raises the probability of technological 
disasters. This result is robust when endogeneity bias is controlled. 
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1. Introduction 
 
As shown in various historical records, the occurrence of disasters appears to 
inevitably influence social and economic conditions. In the field of social science, an 
increasing number of works have investigated the effect of natural disasters and 
associated outcomes. Controversy exists regarding the effect of natural disasters on 
economic growth. Cross-country analysis has been used to show that natural disasters 
have a positive effect on economic growth, by enhancing human capital accumulation 
(Skidmore & Toya 2002). In contrast, county-level data from the United States was used 
to suggest that economic growth rates fall, on average, by 0.45% points, and that nearly 
28% of the growth effect is because of the emigration of wealthier citizens (Strobl 2011). 
In addition, it has been asserted that (Cuaresma et al. 2008) the effect of natural 
disasters on growth differs between developing and developed countries. Further 
studies have also investigated the influence of natural disasters on welfare (Sawada 
2007; Luechinger & Saschkly 2009). With regard to deaths caused by natural disasters, 
GDP per capita, economic openness, the development of financial sectors, and human 
capital formation are all negatively associated with such deaths, especially in less 
developed countries (Toya & Skidmore 2007).1  
The level of damage caused by natural disasters has been explained not only by 
economic factors but also by political and institutional factors.2 Low-quality governance, 
characterized by corruption and income inequality, increases the death rate in a natural 
disaster, whereas democracy and social capital reduces deaths (Anbarci et al. 2005; 
Kahn 2005; Escaleras et al. 2007; Yamamura 2010).3 These factors, however, do not 
affect the probability of a natural disaster occurring because such a probability depends 
on natural conditions.4 In other words, economic and institutional factors are important 
when we analyze how to mitigate, and to what extent, the damage caused by natural 
                                                   
1 Kellenberg and Mobarak (2008) suggest that the relationship between GDP levels and 
the damage caused by natural disasters takes the inverted U shape, rather than being 
monotonically negative. 
2 Media is also considered to be a critical determinant of damage caused by natural 
disasters (Eisensee & Strӧmberg 2007).  
3 Disasters have both direct and indirect detrimental effects on economic conditions. 
One indirect effect is the distortion of allocation through political economy channels. 
Garret and Sobel (2003) examined the flow of Federal Emergency Management 
Administration money and found that nearly half of all disaster relief is motivated 
politically rather than by need.  
4 Kahn (2005) provides evidence that area dummies, absolute value of latitude, and 
land area are important determinants in the occurrence of natural disasters, whereas 
GDP per capita is not considered to be a determinant. 
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disasters. However, these factors are not important when we analyze how to prevent 
natural disasters from occurring.  
According to the Center for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters, disasters can 
generally be divided into two categories: natural and technological disasters. In contrast 
to a natural disaster, human errors are associated with the probability of technological 
disasters because technological disasters are regarded as manmade disasters. Hence, 
economic and institutional factors are thought to play a crucial role in determining the 
probability of technological disasters. Among the various institutional factors, 
corruption is regarded as a major institutional facet. The corruption of bureaucrats is 
considered to influence the cost and incentive structures faced by firms and individuals, 
and economists have long been interested in analyzing how corruption affects the 
performance of an economy. Due in part to a lack of data on corruption, an empirical 
analysis of corruption did not exist prior to the 1990s, although there are number of 
classical anecdotal and theoretical works (Leff 1964; Lui 1985; Shleifer & Vishny 1993).5 
Seminal works from the 1990s (Mauro 1995), which empirically examined the effect of 
corruption, and the compilation of data on corruption, have lead the way for researchers 
to empirically investigate the political and economic outcomes of public sector 
corruption (e.g., Glaeser and Saks 2006; Apergis et al. 2010; Dreher & Schneider 2010; 
Escaleras et al. 2010; Johnson et.al. 2011; Swaleheen 2011).  
With regard to the interactions between politics and economics, investigations 
(Anbarci et al. 2006) have shown that corruption increases the rate of fatal traffic 
accidents, suggesting that corruption is thought to have a sizable effect on the 
occurrence and outcome of accidents by human error. Therefore, it is important to 
investigate the influence of corruption on manmade disasters when considering a 
political economy mechanism. However, little is known about the effect of corruption on 
the probability of technological disasters; thus, it is a topic worth investigating. This 
paper uses panel data from 98 countries to explore the influence of corruption on 
technological disasters. The key finding is that a technological disaster is more likely to 
occur in a country with greater levels of corruption in the public sector. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: section 2 proposes the hypothesis 
to be tested; the data and methods used are explained in section 3; section 4 discusses 
the results of the estimations; and the final section offers concluding observations. 
 
2. Hypothesis 
                                                   
5 Jain (2001) provided a literature review of the classical works and introduced the 
current debate among researchers. 
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Corruption in general is defined as the use of public office for private gains 
(Bardhan 1997). The main forms of corruption include bribes received by public 
officials, the embezzlement of resources by public officials that they are entrusted to 
administer, fraud in the form of manipulating information to further public officials‘ 
personal interests, extortion, and favoritism (Andvig & Fjeldstad 2001). Corruption is 
considered to affect the probability of accidents and manmade disasters via two 
channels; a brief explanation follows. 
First, a key reason for market failure is information asymmetry between market 
demand and supply. An anticipated and necessary role of government is to attenuate 
this failure. In various industries, firms and individuals are obliged to obtain a license 
to commence a business, to ensure a quality service is supplied. Public officials have 
the right to grant these firms and individuals such licenses. For instance, pilots are 
required by law to obtain a pilot license. Airplane companies are obliged by public 
officials to employ pilots with such a license. For the purpose of reducing information 
asymmetry between airplane companies and customers, it is anticipated that public 
officials play an industry-regulating role to ensure flight safety. In reality, however, 
public officials have an incentive to pursue their own self-interest: these public officials 
may accept bribes from firms and individuals to ignore various regulations. 
Assuming that the qualifying standards for obtaining a license are effective in 
determining the techniques, skills, and quality of pilots, these will deteriorate when 
pilots illegitimately receive their pilot license. Individuals make a decision regarding 
how to obtain the license by considering whether the cost of illegitimately purchasing 
the license is lower than the cost of obtaining license legitimately. The corruption of 
public officials results in the ―price of a license‖ in the illegitimate market to fall below 
the cost of passing a legitimate qualifying standard for licensing. Accordingly, 
individuals will purchase the license illegitimately. Consequently, the safety of 
airplanes declines and in turn the probability of airplane accidents increases. Evidence 
regarding the relationship between corruption and traffic accidents (Anbarci 2006) 
supports this inference. The more corrupt a public official is, the cheaper the cost of 
purchasing a license, and the lower the quality and skill of drivers (Bertland et al. 
2007). Inevitably, accidents are more likely to occur. As with airplane pilots and car 
drivers, this inference holds true, in general, within any industries where licenses are 
required. 
The second reason for market failure is that corruption weakens existing 
infrastructure (Vito & Davoodi 1997). The rate of return of projects, as calculated using 
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cost–benefit analysis, is a criterion for project selection. In reality, however, corruption 
motivates bureaucrats to direct public expenditure via channels that make it easier to 
collect bribes. Thus, the productivity of the project is not taken into account when the 
investment project is selected, leading to the distortion of resource allocation. This 
causes a bias towards large-scale construction projects rather than maintenance 
expenditure. Thus, corruption reduces the public spending that is required to keep the 
existing physical infrastructure in a good and safe condition. A previous study (Vito & 
Davoodi 1997) found, using regression analysis, that corruption reduced the 
percentage of total paved roads in good condition, and increased the percentage of 
electricity power system losses over total power output. Based on those results, the 
authors concluded that corruption reduces expenditure on maintenance and operations, 
resulting in low-quality infrastructure (Vito & Davoodi 1997). It seems plausible that 
the deterioration of physical infrastructure increases the likelihood of transport or 
industrial accidents. Corruption inevitably increases the probability of accidents, 
resulting in manmade disasters. 
These inferences lead me to propose the following hypothesis. 
 
Hypothesis: 
A corrupt public sector raises the probability of technological accidents and therefore 
disasters. 
 
3. Data and method 
 
3.1. Data  
Data regarding the number of technological disasters (TECDIS) from 1900 to 2010 
was sourced from EM-DAT (Emergency Events Database).6 In this paper, however, a 
proxy for public sector corruption was available from 1984 as explained later in the 
paper, and as such I used TECDIS data from 1984 to 2010.7  
Definitions and the basic statistics for the variables used in this paper are presented 
in Table 1. The mean value of TECDIS (number of technological disasters) is 1.70 while 
its standard deviation is 4.76, which is nearly three times larger than the mean value. 
                                                   
6 According to the Centre for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters, technological 
disasters can be categorized into three categories: industrial, miscellaneous, and 
transport accidents. http://www.emdat.be/explanatory-notes (accessed on June 15, 
2011). 
7 TECDIS was sourced from the International Disaster Database. http://www.emdat.be 
(accessed on June 1, 2011). 
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The maximum and minimum values of TECDIS are 71 and 0, respectively, indicating a 
significant gap between them. Table 2 shows more detailed statistics regarding TECDIS 
and the frequency of technological disasters. Interestingly, 56.5% of TECDIS had a 
value of 0 and 18.4% just 1. Considering them jointly suggests that TECDIS is 
over-dispersed, a situation that is often observed in the case of disasters and accidents 
(e.g., Kahn 2005; Anbarci et al. 2006; Escaleras et al. 2007).  
With respect to the proxy for corruption, CORR_ICRG and CORR_WD are used. My 
primary measure of public sector corruption (CORR_ICRG) is collected from the 
International Country Risk Guide (ICRG), which includes 146 countries over 27 years 
(1984–2010). ICRG is assembled by the Political Risk Service Group. CORR_ICRG has 
the advantage of covering a longer period than the alternative measure (CORR_WD). 
CORR_ICRG values range from 0 to 6—larger CORR_ICRG values indicate less 
corruption. According to ICRG, the most common form of corruption experienced 
directly in business is financial corruption in the form of demands for special payments 
and bribes connected with licenses. CORR_ICRG captures financial corruption. With 
regard to the alternative measure of corruption, the World Bank constructed the World 
Governance Indicators, which provided the CORR_WD data for 213 countries over 14 
years (1996–2009).8 In comparison with CORR_ICRG, CORR_WD has the advantage of 
including a larger number of countries, although over a shorter time period. 9 
CORR_WD captures perceptions regarding the extent to which public power is 
exercised for private gain, including both petty and grand forms of corruption, as well as 
―capturing‖ corruption by the elite and private interests (Kaufman et al. 2010). 
According to data provided originally by the World Bank, CORR_WD ranges from 0 to 
100, where the larger values suggest less corruption. In this paper, with the aim of 
standardizing the values of the proxy for corruption, I converted CORR_WD to take a 
value range of 0 to 6. This change allows me to compare the effect of CORR_ICRG on 
TECDIS, and that of CORR_ICRG on TECDIS. As exhibited in Table 1, the mean value 
and the standard deviation for CORR_ICRG are 3.19 and 1.46, respectively. In addition, 
the mean value and the standard deviation for CORR_WD are 3.17 and 1.83, 
respectively. This shows that the values for CORR_ICRG are similar to those of 
                                                   
8 It is available from http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.asp (accessed on 
June 1, 2011). 
9 As with CORR_ICRG and CORR_WD, Transparency International also provides the 
proxy for corruption. This data covers 1995 to 2010, which is a shorter period than 
CORR_ICRG. The number of countries included in the data from Transparency 
International is smaller than CORR_WD. That is, the data from Transparency 
International is not as helpful. Therefore, this paper does not use that data in 
estimations. 
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CORR_WD. As shown in Appendix 1, the countries used in the estimations change 
depending on whether CORR_ICRG or CORR_WD is used. 
GDP (GDP per capita), POP (population), GOVSIZ (government size), and INDRAT 
(value-added of industry/GDP) are collected from the World Bank (2010). The available 
data for these variables covered 1960 to 2008. Thus, the data used in the estimations do 
not include 2009, and as such I cannot use 2009 data in the regression, although there 
was 2009 data available regarding TECDIS, CORR_ICRG, and CORR_WD. 
 
3.2. Basic methods 
 
To examine the hypothesis raised previously, this paper uses the negative binominal 
model. The estimated function takes the following form:  
TECDISit = 0 + 1 CORR_ICRG (or CORR_WD) i + 2GDPit + 3POPit + 4GOVSIZit + 
５OPENit + 6INDRATit + 7AFRICi + 7ASIAi+ ui +εit,             (1) 
 
where the dependent variable is TECDISit in country i, for year t.  represents the 
regression parameters, ui the unobservable time-invariant feature of country i, and mt 
represents the unobservable year effects of year t. The effects of ui are controlled for by 
including country dummies. εit represents the error term. When CORRU_ICRG is used 
as the proxy for the degree of corruption the data includes 86 countries, from 1984 to 
2008. In contrast, when CORRU_WD is used as a proxy for the degree of corruption, the 
data includes 92 countries, from 1996 to 2008. TECDIS is the number of technological 
disasters, which does not take the negative value. In this study, the Poisson model is 
used as the basic method of estimation. However, in the Poisson model, it is assumed 
that mean of a dependent variable is equal to its variance. As discussed in subsection 
3.1, TECDIS is over-dispersed and its variance is large. The use of the Poisson model 
here causes a downward bias and inflates z-statistics, and as such, the negative 
binominal model is preferred (Wooldridge 2002, Ch. 19). The negative binominal model 
is applied for empirical analysis to examine the effect of disasters in existing works (e.g., 
Anbarci et al. 2006; Escaleras et al. 2007; Kellenberg & Mobarak 2008), because the 
damage caused by natural disasters is characterized by over-dispersion. In line with 
previous literature, the negative binominal model is used in this paper, although this 
paper focuses on the number of technological disasters rather than the resulting 
damage. 
If the hypothesis is supported, CORR_ICRG (or CORR_WD) will take the negative 
sign. Figures 1(a) and (b) demonstrate the relationship between a country‘s average 
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TECDIS from 1984 to 2008 and a country‘s average corruption (CORR_ICRG) from 1984 
to 2008. Figure 1(a) shows that TECDIS is negatively related to corruption, although 
outliers (China, India, and Nigeria), which experience on average at least 10 times more 
technological disasters, appear to affect the relationship. As presented in Table 2, the 
number of technological disasters is less than 10 for 97% of observations. Therefore, 
outliers with an average TECDIS larger than 10 are removed from the sample, and the 
relationships are illustrated in Figure 1(b). A cursory examination of Figure 1(b) reveals 
that the negative relationship between TECDIS and corruption continues to be 
observed. The findings demonstrated in Figures 1(a) and (b) are congruent to the 
hypothesis. A closer examination of the influence of corruption on TECDIS is explored 
using the regression analysis presented in section 4. 
With regard to control variables, GDP and POP are included to capture basic 
economic conditions. GDP is considered to reflect the degree of economic development 
within a country. In addition to GDP, region dummies such as AFRIC (Africa dummy) 
and ASIA (Asia dummy) are also considered to capture economic development because 
African and Asian countries are generally considered to be less developed than Western 
countries. Higher levels of technology are more likely to be found in developed countries. 
As a consequence, there are greater preventative measures against technological 
disasters, resulting in a lower probability of these occurring. Therefore, GDP is expected 
to take the negative sign, whereas AFRIC and ASIA are predicted to take the positive 
sign. In contrast, technology is less likely to be used in less developed countries because 
technology-intensive sectors have not yet been well established. If this holds true, 
technology is less likely to be used and so the probability of industrial disasters is lower 
in less developed countries. Therefore, technological disasters are more likely to occur in 
developed countries. That is, the effect of GDP on TECDIS, and that of AFRIC and ASIA 
will be contrasting. For the purpose of controlling for the differing effects caused by 
economic structure, INDRAT (value-added of industry/GDP) is used. Higher rates of 
industry lead to higher rates of technological disasters. Thus, INDRAT is predicted to 
take the positive sign.  
The presence of government is captured by GOVSIZ. Even after controlling for quality 
of government with CORR_ICRG (or CORR_WD), government appears to envelop the 
private sector. Technological disasters in the private sector result in a decrease in the 
demand for goods, and therefore a decrease in profits. Thus, private firms have an 
incentive to avoid disasters so as to not reduce profit. As a result, private firms make 
various invests in accident prevention. In contrast to the private sector, governments do 
not have such an incentive, leading to a higher probability that a technological disaster 
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will occur in the public sector. In light of the above, it is possible to infer that GOVSIZ 
increases the probability of disasters and so takes the positive sign. OPEN is considered 
to reflect the importance of technology via trade. OPEN appears to have the opposite 
effect as follows: importing technology increases the frequency of using technology, 
raising the probability of disasters. In contrast, imported technology is accompanied by 
disaster prevention measures, reducing the possibility of disasters. Therefore, the sign 
for OPEN depends on whether the positive effect outweighs the negative. 
  
 
3.3. Two-stage method to control for endogeneity bias 
―Public sector corruption is commonly known to be highly correlated with … omitted 
institutional factors‖ (Escaleras et al. 2007, p. 219). Thus, CORR_ICRG (or CORR_WD) 
is regarded as an endogenous variable, causing the estimation results to suffer from 
bias. The inclusion of country dummies controls for unobserved country-specific 
time-invariant features, which is represented as ui. in Equation (1). This allows ui. to be 
arbitrarily related to the observable CORR_ICRG (or CORR_WD), (Wooldridge 2002, 
265–266). That is, the inclusion of country dummies attenuates the endogeneity bias. In 
addition, for the purpose of controlling for bias and following the methodology of 
previous studies (Escaleras et al. 2007), I estimated the predicted values of 
CORR_ICRG (or CORR_WD) in the first stage estimation and included the predicted 
values as independent variables in the second stage. The first stage regression, in the 
form of Equation (2), is estimated with CORR_ICRG (or CORR_WD) as the dependent 
variable:  
CORR_ICRG (or CORR_WD)it=β0 + β1 LEGA_FREi +β2 CATHOi +β3GDPit +β
4POPit +β5GOVSIZit +β6OPENit +β7INDRATit +sit             (2) 
 
The dependent variables CORR_ICRG (or CORR_WD) take a value between 0 and 6, 
and so the sample includes each extreme value. Therefore, I used the two-limit Tobit, 
where the lower and upper bounds are 0 and 6, respectively. Existing literature has 
clearly stated that institutional factors such as legal origin, ethnic heterogeneity, and 
religion determine the level of corruption (e.g., Treisman 2000; Paldam 2001; Djanskov 
et al. 2003; Serra 2006; Gokcekus 2008; Pellegrini & Gerlagh 2008). In this paper, I use 
LEGA_FRE (French legal origin dummy) and CATHO (percentage of the population 
that is Catholic in 1980) as instrumental variables.10 LEGA_FRE and CATHO were 
                                                   
10 Previous works generally used the percentage of Protestants to examine corruption. 
In this paper, however, this data is not used because it did not create a good fit with the 
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sourced from an earlier work (La Porta et al. 1999).11 It was observed in previous 
studies (Treisman 2000; Serra 2006) that the public sector is more inclined to be corrupt 
in those French legal origin countries that are now regarded as civil law countries. 
Pre-reform Christians have been previously defined as including Catholics, and 
Orthodox and other ‗Old‘ churches (Paldam 2001). It has been suggested that the public 
sector is more likely to be corrupt in the countries where Pre-reform Christians are 
dominant (Paldam 2001). If this holds true, then Catholics are negatively associated 
with CORR_ICRG and CORR_WD. Thus, the predicted signs of LEGA_FRE and 
CATHO are negative. These instrumental variables are time-invariant and are removed 
when country dummies are included. Therefore, the country dummies were not 
incorporated in the two-stage estimations. 
 
4. Results 
 
4.1. Basic results 
The estimations results when CORR_ICRG is used are set out in Tables 3, 4(a), and 
(b). Results when CORR_WD is used are reported in Tables 5, 6(a) and (b). As shown in 
Figure 1, there are outliers with regard to TECDIS. From Table 1, the mean of TECDIS 
is 1.70 and the maximum value is 71, indicating that that the sample is skewed. 
Outliers are thought to significantly influence the estimation results. To address this, 
estimations are conducted using a sub-sample that excludes outliers. A closer look to 
determine robustness shows that there are two outliers in TECDIS larger than 10 and 
20. In the sub-sample that excludes TECDIS observations larger than 20, the mean and 
standard deviation are 1.28 and 2.55, respectively. In the sub-sample excluding TECDIS 
observations larger than 10, the mean and standard deviation are 1.06 and 1.85, 
respectively. The significance of the fall in mean for TECDIS can be seen by considering 
the ratio of TECDIS‘‘s standard deviation to its mean value. For instance, the ratio is 
2.80 in the full sample shown in Table 1, while the ratio is 1.75 for the sub-sample 
excluding TECDIS observations larger than 10. Tables 4(a) and 6(a) show the results 
where outliers defined as TECDIS larger than 20 are excluded, and Tables 4(b) and 6(b) 
present the results excluding outliers defined as TECDIS larger than 10. In each table, 
results without country dummies are shown in columns (1)–(3), while results with 
country dummies are in columns (4)–(6). In all estimations, z-statistics are calculated 
                                                                                                                                                     
estimated model when used as an independent variable. 
11 It is available at http://www.economics.harvard.edu/faculty/shleifer/dataset 
(Accessed on May 1, 2011). 
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using robust standard errors to control for heteroscedasticity. 
I will now discuss the results shown in Table 3. Consistent with my prediction, the 
coefficients of CORR_ICRG take the negative sign in all estimations and are 
statistically significant at the 1% level. The absolute values of the coefficients are 
between 0.11 and 0.17 in columns (1)–(6). With respect to control variables, GDP yields 
a significant positive sign in columns (2) and (3). In contrast, GDP produces the 
negative sign while being statistically significant at the 1% level in columns (4)–(6). The 
contrasting results for GDP are mainly because of the inclusion of country dummies. 
Furthermore, the results for GDP exhibited in Table 4 are similar to those of Table 3. 
Thus, it follows that GDP is correlated with unobserved country-specific time-invariant 
features such as institutional conditions. This result implies that economic development 
reduces the possibility of technological disasters after controlling for institutional 
factors. The results for the other control variables POP, GOVSIZ, OPEN, and INDRAT 
(Table 3) differ from those of Table 5, implying that their estimation results are not 
robust.12 Concerning regional dummies, AFRIC and ASIA produce the positive sign and 
are statistically significant at the 1% level, which is similar to the results of Table 5. 
This implies that technology is not able to be used appropriately in less developed 
countries, in part because human capital has not, as yet, been sufficiently 
accumulated.13  
I now turn to the results for CORR_ICRG in Tables 4(a) and (b), to check for 
robustness in Table 3. CORR_ICRG continues to yield the negative sign and be 
statistically significant at the 1% level. In addition, its absolute values are between 0.10 
and 0.17, which are similar to those exhibited in Table 3. Therefore, the effect of 
CORR_ICRG on TECDIS is significantly negative even when outliers are excluded. 
In Table 5, concerning results without country dummies, the sign for CORR_WD is 
negative in columns (1) and (3), and positive in column (2). Furthermore, CORR_WD is 
not statistically significant in columns (2) and (3). The inclusion of country dummies 
significantly changes the results of CORR_WD. CORR_WD takes the negative sign and 
is statistically significant at the 1% level in columns (4)–(6). Furthermore, absolute 
values of CORR_WD are 0.21 and 0.22, which shows the results of CORR_WD are 
stable and in line with the expectation. The significant difference of results between 
samples with and without country dummies show that CORR_WD is strongly correlated 
                                                   
12 The results for the control variables in Tables 4 (a) and (b) also differ from Tables 6(a) 
and (b), although these results are not reported. These results are available upon 
request from the author. 
13 Long-term panel data for the proxy for human capital could not be obtained and as 
such the proxy was not included as an independent variable.  
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with unobserved country-specific time-invariant features. Tables 6(a) and (b) show that 
similar results can be observed in the results of the sub-samples excluding observations 
with TECDIS larger than 10 and 20. However, the statistical significance of Tables 6(a) 
and (b) declined to the 5% or 10% levels. Furthermore, the absolute values of 
CORR_WD are between 0.11 and 0.14, which are approximately half the value of those 
in Table 5. The omission of outliers reduces the effect of CORR_WD. I interpret these 
results to indicate that the smaller sample size of Table 5 (compared with Table 4) has 
caused the results to be unstable and dependent on the specification. 
 
4.2. Estimation results using instrumental variables. 
The second stage results when the predicted CORR_ICRG is used as a proxy for 
corruption are shown in Tables 7, 8(a) and (b). The second stage results when the 
predicted CORR_WD is used are shown in Tables 9, 10(a) and (b). The first stage results 
of Tables 7 and 9 are exhibited in Appendixes 2 and 3, respectively. Tables 8(a) and 10(a) 
show the results excluding observations from the sample with TECDIS larger than 20, 
and Tables 8(b) and 10(b) present the results excluding observations from the sample 
with TECDIS larger than 10. 
In Appendixes 2 and 3, the Wald Chi-square values are sufficiently large, indicating a 
high statistical significance regarding the determination of corruption.14 Furthermore, 
concerning instrumental variables, as exhibited in Appendixes 2 and 3, CATHO yields 
the predicted negative sign and is statistically significant in all columns. LEGA_FRE 
takes the expected negative sign and is statistically significant at the 1% level in 
columns (1)–(3) of Appendix 2, although the sign for LEGA_FRE is not negative in 
Appendix 3. Therefore, to a certain extent, the Tobit model is appropriately specified, 
supporting the predicted values of CORR_ICRG and CORR_WD. Furthermore, in 
column (1), the log pseudo-likelihood is –3175 in Appendix 2, and –1745 in Appendix 3. 
With regard to the number of extreme values for the proxy for corruption in Appendix 2 
for 2007 observations, there were 40 left-censored observations and 158 right-censored. 
In contrast, in Appendix 3, among the 1,157 observations, there were 4 left-censored 
observations and 11 right-censored. Overall, the two-limit Tobit model is a better fit to 
estimate CORR_ICRG than CORR_WD. The predicted values of CORR_ICRG appear to 
be more reliable than those of CORR_WD when we jointly consider the results from the 
first stage. Thus, careful attention must be paid to reliability when we interpret 
estimation results using the predicted value of CORR_ICRG and CORR_WD. 
                                                   
14 The first stage results of Tables 8(a) and (b), and 10(a) and (b) are not reported 
because of space limitations. The results are available upon request from the author. 
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In Table 7, the significant negative sign of CORR_ICRG in all estimations suggests 
that the results of Table 3 are robust even after controlling for endogeneity bias. I see 
from Tables 8(a) and (b) that CORR_ICRG continues to yield a significant negative sign 
in all estimations when outliers are removed from the sample, which is similar to the 
results in Tables 4(a) and (b). Furthermore, its absolute values range from 0.40 to 0.68, 
meaning that a 1-point increase in CORR_ICRG reduces the probability of technological 
disasters by 0.40–0.68 times. With the mean value of TECDIS at 1.70 and the values for 
CORR_ICRG ranging between 0 and 7, the effect of CORR_ICRG on TECDIS is 
significant. In contrast, the absolute values (exhibited in Tables 3, 4 (a) and (b), ranging 
between 0.10 and 0.17) are four times larger. This implies that endogeneity results in 
the under-estimation of the size of the effect. 
With respect to Table 9, CORR_WD continues to produce the negative sign and be 
statistically significant at the 1% level in all estimations. The same results can be 
observed in Tables 10(a) and (b), implying that the removal of the outliers‘ effect does 
not change the result. Its absolute values range between 1.20 and 2.99, showing that 
the size of the effect is unstable and varies significantly depending on the specification. 
The fact that the absolute values, as shown in columns (4)–(6) of Tables 5 and 6, range 
between 0.11 and 0.22 suggest that the effects of CORR_WD become approximately 10 
times larger than those where endogeneity bias is not controlled for. Furthermore, 
considering that the mean value of TECDIS is 1.70 and the values for CORR_ICRG 
range between 0 and 7, infers that the absolute values of CORR_ICRG are 
unreasonably large, suggesting that the results are not accurate. A reason for this could 
be that the sample size of Tables 9 and 10 are smaller than those for Tables 7 and 8. 
Aside from sample size, as explained in subsection 3.1, CORR_ICRG captures the 
demands for special payments and bribes whereas CORR_WD does not capture these 
directly. Thus, CORR_ICRG is more appropriate to examine the hypothesis because the 
bribes for licenses are considered to be an important aspect of the hypothesis. That is, 
measurement error may be a reason why the effect of CORR_WD is biased. However, 
the combined results of CORR_WD that appeared in Tables 5, 6, 9, and 10 made it 
evident that CORR_WD has a negative effect on TECDIS. 
The results of Table 3–5 discussed so far strongly support the hypothesis that 
corruption increases the probability of technological disasters. Considering the results 
jointly leads me to argue that institutional quality plays a crucial role in determining 
the probability of manmade technological disasters, and should, therefore, be taken into 
account when mechanisms regarding manmade disasters are explored. 
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5. Conclusion 
 
Disasters have a tremendous impact on economic and political conditions, even in 
modern society. Increasingly, researchers are paying greater attention to the issue 
of disasters and a growing number of works are attempting to ascertain the 
determinants of the damage caused by natural disasters. The probability of a 
natural disaster occurring, however, depends on geographical features rather than 
economic or political factors. Therefore, it is beyond the scope of social science to 
prevent natural disasters. In contrast, manmade disasters, such as technological 
disasters, appear to be affected by institutions formed via long-term interactions 
between individuals. For instance, previous literature has provided evidence that 
public sector corruption influences economic condition via various channels. It has 
also been suggested (Escaleras et al. 2007) that public sector corruption results in 
increases in fatalities caused by natural disasters. This claim is supported by further 
evidence that the rate of traffic fatalities is also influenced by corruption (Anbarci et al. 
2006). However, there is little information regarding the relationship between public 
sector corruption and the probability of manmade disasters. Thus, this paper attempts 
to investigate how corruption influences the probability of technological disasters, and 
the extent of that influence, using panel data from 98 countries from 1984 to 2008.  
The major finding is that public sector corruption increases the probability of 
technological disasters. The result does not change even when country dummies are 
included or endogeneity bias is controlled for. Thus, it can be argued that the higher 
the level of corruption within a public sector, the higher the risk of industrial, 
transport, or other accidents. These accidents occur less frequently than traffic 
accidents, however, they cause greater economic and social loss. As a result, 
individuals change their behavior regarding risk. Therefore, the roles of both 
risk-coping behavior and the insurance market will change with regard to 
corruption. Corruption is believed to impede the function of the market. Thus, an 
indirect detrimental effect of corruption is that it reduces social welfare. This 
indirect effect of corruption needs to be taken into account, although few 
researchers do. An analysis of risk-coping behavior and the insurance market is 
important when the effects of disasters are required to be considered (Sawada and 
Shimizutani 2007; 2008;). 
  The probability of technological disasters is explored in this paper. However, the 
effect of public sector corruption on the damage (and its extent) caused by technological 
disasters was not included in the scope of this study. Jointly analyzing the probability 
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and damage caused by technological disasters would provide useful evidence for policy 
making. Furthermore, this paper used aggregated-level data for estimations. Thus, a 
detailed individual-level analysis was not conducted. Accordingly, how individual 
behavior relates to manmade disasters with regard to institutional conditions requires 
future investigation. To this end, field (or laboratory) experiments are desirable. 
Furthermore, aside from corruption, other institutional factors appear to affect the 
probability of manmade disasters. Thus, the effects of various institutional factors on 
the probability of manmade disasters should be examined. These remaining issues 
require further investigation in future studies.   
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(a) Full sample 
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(b) Outliers (number of technological disasters is larger than 10) are excluded. 
Figure 1. Association between corruption (CORR_ICRG) and number of technological 
disasters
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Table 1. Variable definitions and basic statistics 
Variable Definition Mean Standard 
deviation 
Maximum Minimum 
TECDIS 
 
Number of technological disasters 1.70 4.76 71 0 
   Independent variables     
CORR_ICRG Corruption index of international country risk guide 
(ICRG). 
3.19 1.46 6 0 
CORR_WD Corruption index of World Bank. 
 
3.17 1.83 6 0 
GDP GDP per capita (thousand US$) 
 
7.46 10.0 56.3 0.06 
POP 
 
Population (million) 44.3 151.1 1300 0.06 
GOVSIZ 
 
Government consumption expenditure/ GDP  0.15 0.06 0.76 0.02 
OPEN 
 
Trade/GDP 0.77 0.51 4.56 0.11 
INDRAT 
 
Value-added of industry /GDP. 0.30 0.10 0.78 0.01 
AFRIC 
 
Africa country dummy --- --- --- --- 
ASIA 
 
Asia country dummy --- --- --- --- 
 Instrumental variables     
LEGA_FRE French legal origin dummy 
 
--- --- --- --- 
CATHO Share of population that is Catholic 
 
0.39 0.37 0.97 0 
Note: CORR_WD is the value between 1996 and 2008. All other variables show the values for 1984–2008. 
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Table 2. Frequency of technological disasters 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Number of 
TECDIS 
Frequency % 
0 1,574 56.21 
1 517 18.46 
2 243 8.68 
3 141 5.04 
4 77 2.75 
5 49 1.75 
6 33 1.18 
7 27 0.96 
8 22 0.79 
9 23 0.82 
10 15 0.54 
11 8 0.29 
12 5 0.18 
13 5 0.18 
14 4 0.14 
15 4 0.14 
16 6 0.21 
17 1 0.04 
18 1 0.04 
19 7 0.25 
20 38 1.36  
Total 2,800 100 
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Table 3. Negative binominal estimation (TECDIS is a dependent variable; 
CORR_ICRG is a proxy for corruption): 1984–2008 
  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
CORR_ICRG –0.17*** 
(–5.71) 
–0.11*** 
(–4.01) 
–0.13*** 
(–4.39) 
–0.13*** 
(–4.29) 
–0.12*** 
(–3.77) 
–0.13*** 
(–4.28) 
GDP 0.003 
(0.73) 
0.01*** 
(3.09) 
0.01*** 
(3.07) 
–0.03*** 
(–2.86) 
–0.04*** 
(–3.28) 
–0.04*** 
(–2.97) 
POP 
 
0.004*** 
(8.70) 
0.002*** 
(17.3) 
0.002*** 
(16.6) 
0.004*** 
(4.79) 
0.003*** 
(3.64) 
0.003*** 
(3.63) 
GOVSIZ 
 
 –1.82*** 
(–2.62) 
–1.13 
(–1.48) 
 –4.02*** 
(–3.79) 
–3.70*** 
(–3.33) 
OPEN 
 
 –1.15*** 
(–11.8) 
–1.28*** 
(–12.7) 
 0.62*** 
(3.26) 
0.51*** 
(2.48) 
INDRAT 
 
  0.82** 
(2.39) 
  0.27** 
(1.06) 
AFRIC 
 
0.50*** 
(5.48) 
0.49*** 
(5.23) 
0.50*** 
(5.20) 
   
ASIA 
 
0.58*** 
(6.67) 
0.99*** 
(10.5) 
1.01*** 
(10.3) 
   
Constant 
 
0.32** 
(3.03) 
1.06*** 
(7.91) 
0.82*** 
(5.13) 
0.09 
(0.32) 
0.43 
(1.11) 
0.27 
(0.06) 
Country 
dummies3 
 No  No  No   Yes   Yes   Yes 
Wald 
Chi-square 
332.9*** 1463.0**
* 
1499.9*** 41266.4**
* 
15226.4**
* 
23682.6*
** 
Observations 2077 1984 1873 2077 1984 1873 
1. Numbers in parentheses are z-statistics calculated using robust standard errors.  
2. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.  
3. ―No‖ means that dummies are not included while ―Yes‖ means that dummies are 
included.  
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Table 4. Negative binominal estimation (TECDIS is a dependent variable; 
CORR_ICRG is a proxy for corruption): 1984–2008 and excludes outliers  
 
(a) TECDIS is smaller than 20 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
CORR_ICRG –0.13*** 
(–4.07) 
–0.14*** 
(–4.51) 
–0.16*** 
(–4.92) 
–0.11*** 
(–3.42) 
–0.10*** 
(–3.06) 
–0.12*** 
(–3.55) 
Country 
dummies3 
 No  No  No   Yes   Yes   Yes 
Wald 
Chi-square 
183.4*** 370.3*** 369.3*** 10485.5*** 14816.8**
* 
31766.4*** 
Observations 2044 1956 1845 2044 1956 1845 
1. Numbers in parentheses are z-statistics calculated using robust standard errors.  
2. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.  
3. ―No‖ means that dummies are not included while ―Yes‖ means that dummies are 
included.  
4. In each column, constant and control variables corresponding to Table 3 are 
included but not reported because of space limitations. 
 
(b) TECDIS is smaller than 10 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
CORR_ICRG –0.17*** 
(–5.71) 
–0.11*** 
(–4.01) 
–0.13*** 
(–4.39) 
–0.13*** 
(–4.29) 
–0.12*** 
(–3.77) 
–0.13*** 
(–4.28) 
Country 
dummies3 
 No  No  No   Yes   Yes   Yes 
Wald 
Chi-square 
332.9*** 1463.0**
* 
1499.9*** 41266.4**
* 
15226.4**
* 
23682.6*
** 
Observations 2001 1918 1807 2001 1918 1807 
1. Numbers in parentheses are z-statistics calculated using robust standard errors.  
2. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.  
3. ―No‖ means that dummies are not included while ―Yes‖ means that dummies are 
included.  
4. In each column, constant and control variables corresponding to Table 3 are 
included but not reported because of space limitations. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 5. Negative binominal estimation (TECDIS is a dependent variable; 
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CORR_WD is a proxy for corruption): 1996–2008  
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
CORR_WD –0.17*** 
(–4.14) 
0.006 
(0.15) 
–0.003 
(–0.07) 
–0.21*** 
(–3.46) 
–0.22*** 
(–3.42) 
–0.22*** 
(–3.42) 
GDP 0.003 
(0.53) 
–0.008 
(–1.27) 
–0.006 
(–0.92) 
–0.13*** 
(–4.75) 
–0.14*** 
(–4.71) 
–0.14*** 
(–4.64) 
POP 
 
0.004*** 
(6.20) 
0.002*** 
(13.6) 
0.002*** 
(11.9) 
0.001 
(0.82) 
0.002 
(0.20) 
0.003 
(0.24) 
GOVSIZ 
 
 –0.75 
(–0.81) 
–0.03 
(–0.03) 
 –1.46 
(–0.86) 
–0.80 
(–0.46) 
OPEN 
 
 –1.49*** 
(–11.5) 
–1.72*** 
(–11.3) 
 0.42 
(1.48) 
0.33 
(1.04) 
INDRAT 
 
  1.61*** 
(3.65) 
  0.008 
(0.72) 
AFRIC 
 
0.62*** 
(5.26) 
0.49*** 
(4.27) 
0.57*** 
(4.85) 
   
ASIA 
 
0.65*** 
(5.44) 
1.12*** 
(8.51) 
1.15*** 
(8.46) 
   
Constant 
 
0.29** 
(2.30) 
1.03*** 
(6.18) 
0.60*** 
(2.98) 
0.66** 
(2.41) 
0.63 
(1.27) 
0.40 
(0.76) 
Country 
dummies3 
 No  No  No   Yes   Yes   Yes 
Wald 
Chi-square 
242.6*** 1015.9**
* 
1099.4*** 39385.4*
** 
27014.7*
** 
26053.3
*** 
Observation
s 
1157 1092 1035 1157 1092 1035 
1. Numbers in parentheses are z-statistics calculated using robust standard errors.  
2. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.  
3. ―No‖ means that dummies are not included while ―Yes‖ means that dummies are 
included.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 6. Negative binominal estimation (TECDIS is a dependent variable; CORR_WD is 
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a proxy for corruption): 1984–2008 and excludes outliers 
 
(a) TECDIS is smaller than 20 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
CORR_WD –0.07* 
(–1.83) 
–0.008 
(–0.20) 
–0.03 
(–0.69) 
–0.11* 
(–1.87) 
–0.14** 
(–2.31) 
–0.14** 
(–2.31) 
Country 
dummies3 
 No  No  No   Yes   Yes   Yes 
Wald 
Chi-square 
164.5*** 289.7*** 294.2*** 1328.7 1246.1 1189.2 
Observations 1132 1072 1015 1132 1072 1015 
1. Numbers in parentheses are z-statistics calculated using robust standard errors.  
2. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.  
3. ―No‖ means that dummies are not included while ―Yes‖ means that dummies are 
included.  
4. In each column, constant and control variables corresponding to Table 5 are included 
but not reported because of space limitations. 5. In columns (4)–(6), Wald Chi-square 
could not be obtained and so the absolute values of log pseudo-likelihood are reported. 
 
(b) TECDIS is smaller than 10 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
CORR_WD –0.01 
(–0.52) 
0.03 
(0.87) 
0.02 
(0.53) 
–0.11* 
(–1.79) 
–0.13** 
(–2.07) 
–0.14** 
(–2.07) 
Country 
dummies3 
 No  No  No   Yes   Yes   Yes 
Wald 
Chi-square 
417.0*** 493.5*** 475.3*** 20103.6*** 21975.2**
* 
25610.9*** 
Observations 1108 1053 996 1108 1053 996 
1. Numbers in parentheses are z-statistics calculated using robust standard errors.  
2. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.  
3. ―No‖ means that dummies are not included while ―Yes‖ means that dummies are 
included.  
4. In each column, constant and control variables corresponding to Table 5 are 
included but not reported because of space limitations. 
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Table 7. Negative binominal estimation using predicted value of CORR-ICRG 
(TECDIS is a dependent variable): 1984–2008 
   
 (1) 
 
(2) 
 
(3) 
 
CORR_ICRG –0.40*** 
(–3.14) 
–0.67*** 
(–4.34) 
–0.65*** 
(–4.50) 
GDP 0.02** 
(2.09) 
0.06*** 
(4.59) 
0.05*** 
(4.67) 
POP 
 
0.004*** 
(7.26) 
0.002*** 
(16.0) 
0.002*** 
(15.5) 
GOVSIZ 
 
 1.17 
(1.13) 
1.91* 
(1.76) 
OPEN 
 
 –1.27*** 
(–12.4) 
–1.39*** 
(–13.4) 
INDRAT 
 
  0.36 
(1.00) 
AFRIC 
 
0.42*** 
(3.51) 
0.23** 
(1.98) 
0.25** 
(2.14) 
ASIA 
 
0.47*** 
(4.28) 
0.84*** 
(8.14) 
0.88*** 
(8.56) 
Constant 
 
0.91*** 
(2.54) 
2.26*** 
(6.22) 
2.06*** 
(5.52) 
Wald Chi-square 263.4*** 1418.1*** 1428.7*** 
Observations 2077 1984 1873 
1. Numbers in parentheses are z-statistics calculated using robust standard errors.  
2. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.  
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Table 8. Negative binominal estimation using predicted value of CORR-ICRG 
(TECDIS is a dependent variable): 1984–2008 and excludes outliers 
         
(a) TECDIS is smaller than 20 
 
 (1) 
 
(2) 
 
(3) 
 
CORR_ ICRG. –0.48*** 
(–4.07) 
–0.68*** 
(–4.19) 
–0.64*** 
(–4.41) 
Wald Chi-square 251.0*** 618.7*** 623.3*** 
Observations 2044 1956 1845 
1. Numbers in parentheses are z-statistics calculated using robust standard errors.  
2. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.  
3. In each column, constant and control variables corresponding to Table 7 are included 
but not reported because of space limitations. 
 
 
 
 
 
(b) TECDIS is smaller than 10 
 
 (1) 
 
(2) 
 
(3) 
 
CORR_ ICRG. –0.43*** 
(–3.73) 
–0.44*** 
(–2.85) 
–0.48*** 
(–3.41) 
Wald Chi-square 308.0*** 615.9*** 623.4*** 
Observations 2001 1918 1807 
1. Numbers in parentheses are z-statistics calculated using robust standard errors.  
2. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.  
3. In each column, constant and control variables corresponding to Table 7 are 
included but not reported because of space limitations. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 9. Negative binominal estimation using predicted value of CORR-WD 
 28 
(TECDIS is a dependent variable): 1996–2008 
  
 (1) 
 
(2) 
 
(3) 
 
CORR_WD –1.20*** 
(–4.57) 
–2.99*** 
(–5.57) 
–2.54*** 
(–4.93) 
GDP 0.12*** 
(4.04) 
0.27*** 
(5.36) 
0.23*** 
(4.71) 
POP 
 
0.004*** 
(4.80) 
0.002*** 
(12.9) 
0.001*** 
(9.67) 
GOVSIZ 
 
 20.8*** 
(5.33) 
18.5*** 
(4.87) 
OPEN 
 
 –1.09*** 
(–7.89) 
–1.52*** 
(–10.1) 
INDRAT 
 
  2.41*** 
(4.86) 
AFRIC 
 
–0.16 
(–0.68) 
–1.72*** 
(–4.26) 
1.33*** 
(3.40) 
ASIA 
 
0.39** 
(2.50) 
0.70*** 
(4.61) 
0.77*** 
(4.97) 
Constant 
 
2.83*** 
(4.28) 
5.33*** 
(6.67) 
4.18*** 
(5.52) 
Wald Chi-square 214.6*** 1105.1*** 1147.5*** 
Observations 1157 1092 1035 
1. Numbers in parentheses are z-statistics calculated using robust standard errors.  
2. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 10. Negative binominal estimation using predicted value of CORR-WD 
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(TECDIS is a dependent variable): 1996–2008 and excludes outliers 
  
 
(a) TECDIS is smaller than 20 
 
 (1) 
 
(2) 
 
(3) 
 
CORR_ WD. –1.21*** 
(–4.65) 
–2.93*** 
(–5.36) 
–2.57*** 
(–4.83) 
Wald Chi-square 269.2*** 533.2*** 478.6*** 
Observations 1132 1072 1015 
1. Numbers in parentheses are z-statistics calculated using robust standard errors.  
2. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.  
3. In each column, constant and control variables corresponding to Table 9 are 
included but not reported because of space limitations. 
 
 
 
 
(b) TECDIS is smaller than 10 
 
 (1) 
 
(2) 
 
(3) 
 
CORR_ WD. –1.21*** 
(–4.36) 
–3.17*** 
(–4.73) 
–2.50*** 
(–4.11) 
Wald Chi-square 585.3*** 767.5*** 716.0*** 
Observations 1108 1053 996 
1. Numbers in parentheses are z-statistics calculated using robust standard errors.  
2. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.  
3. In each column, constant and control variables corresponding to Table 9 are 
included but not reported because of space limitations. 
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Appendix 1. List of countries used in the analysis 
 
Number Name CORR_ICRG CORR_WD  Number Name CORR_ICRG CORR_WD 
1 Argentina # #  51 Liberia # # 
2 Australia # #  52 Libya # # 
3 Austria # #  53 Luxembourg # # 
4 Bangladesh # #  54 Madagascar # # 
5 Belgium # #  55 Malawi # # 
6 Belize  #  56 Malaysia # # 
7 Benin  #  57 Malta # # 
8 Bolivia # #  58 Mauritania  # 
9 Brazil # #  59 Mexico # # 
10 
Burkina 
Faso 
# #  60 Morocco # # 
11 Burundi  #  61 Nepal  # 
12 Cameroon # #  62 Netherlands # # 
13 Canada # #  63 
New 
Zealand 
# # 
14 Central Africa #  64 Nicaragua # # 
15 Chad  #  65 Niger # # 
16 Chile # #  66 Nigeria # # 
17 China # #  67 Norway # # 
18 Colombia # #  68 Oman # # 
19 
Congo, 
Dem.  
# #  69 Pakistan # # 
20 
Congo, 
Rep. 
#   70 Panama # # 
21 Costa Rica # #  71 
Papua New 
Guinea 
# # 
22 
Cote 
d'Ivoire 
# #  72 Paraguay # # 
23 Denmark # #  73 Peru # # 
24 
Dominican 
Rep 
# #  74 Philippines # # 
25 Ecuador # #  75 Portugal # # 
26 Egypt #   76 Puerto Rico  # 
27 El Salvador # #  77 Rwanda  # 
28 Fiji  #  78 Senegal # # 
29 Finland # #  79 Seychelles  # 
30 France # #  80 
Sierra 
Leone 
# # 
31 Gabon # #  81 Singapore # # 
 31 
32 Georgia  #  82 South Africa # # 
33 Ghana # #  83 Spain # # 
34 Greece # #  84 Sri Lanka # # 
35 Guatemala # #  85 Sudan # # 
36 Guyana # #  86 Sweden # # 
37 Haiti # #  87 Switzerland # # 
38 Honduras # #  88 
Syrian Arab 
Republic 
#  
39 Hong Kong #   89 Thailand # # 
40 Hungary # #  90 Togo # # 
41 India # #  91 
Trinidad 
and Tobago 
# # 
42 Indonesia # #  92 Tunisia # # 
43 Ireland # #  93 
United 
Kingdom 
# # 
44 Israel # #  94 
United 
States 
# # 
45 Italy # #  95 Uruguay # # 
46 Japan # #  96 
Venezuela, 
RB 
#  
47 Kenya # #  97 Zambia # # 
48 Korea, Rep. #   98 Zimbabwe # # 
49 Kuwait # #      
50 Lesotho   #      
Note: # means that observations are included in the sample used for the estimation. 
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Appendix 2. First stage results for Table 7; 
Two-limit Tobit estimation 
(CORR_ICRG is a dependent variable): 1984–2008 
  
 (1) 
 
(2) 
 
(3) 
 
LEGA_FRE –0.34*** 
(–4.94) 
–0.39*** 
(–5.65) 
–0.35*** 
(–5.00) 
CATHO –0.005*** 
(–5.05) 
–0.002** 
(–2.18) 
–0.003*** 
(–3.63) 
GDP 0.07*** 
(21.9) 
0.06*** 
(18.4) 
0.06*** 
(17.2) 
POP 
 
–0.0001 
(–0.99) 
–0.0002* 
(–1.79) 
–0.0002* 
(–1.84) 
GOVSIZ 
 
 4.73*** 
(8.14) 
5.13*** 
(7.67) 
OPEN 
 
 –0.13*** 
(–2.62) 
–0.13** 
(–2.41) 
INDRAT 
 
  –0.37 
(–1.28) 
AFRIC 
 
–0.95*** 
(–11.5) 
–0.77*** 
(–8.80) 
–0.86*** 
(–9.54) 
ASIA 
 
–1.05*** 
(–10.1) 
–0.68*** 
(–6.02) 
–0.74*** 
(–6.37) 
Constant 
 
3.46*** 
(36.7) 
2.76*** 
(21.0) 
2.91*** 
(18.7) 
Log pseudo-likelihood –3175 –2967 –2793 
Left-censored observations 
(CORR_ICRG = 0) 
40 35 35 
Right-censored observations 
(CORR_ICRG = 6) 
158 154 148 
Observations 2077 1984 1873 
1. Numbers in parentheses are z-statistics calculated using robust standard errors.   
2. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.  
3. Upper and lower bounds are 6 and 0, respectively. 
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Appendix 3. First stage results for Table 9; 
Two-limit Tobit estimation 
(CORR_WD is a dependent variable): 1996-2008 
   
 (1) 
 
(2) 
 
(3) 
 
LEGA_FRE 0.01 
(0.18) 
0.001 
(0.02) 
0.03 
(0.48) 
CATHO –0.005*** 
(–4.40) 
–0.002** 
(–2.07) 
–0.002** 
(–2.41) 
GDP 0.10*** 
(26.7) 
0.09*** 
(23.6) 
0.09*** 
(23.7) 
POP 
 
–0.0001 
(–1.16) 
–0.0007 
(–0.56) 
–0.0001 
(–0.97) 
GOVSIZ 
 
 6.96*** 
(10.1) 
7.12*** 
(10.2) 
OPEN 
 
 0.13** 
(2.12) 
0.09 
(1.41) 
INDRAT 
 
  0.21 
(0.53) 
AFRIC 
 
–1.06*** 
(–10.4) 
–0.87*** 
(–8.10) 
–0.90*** 
(–8.35) 
ASIA 
 
–0.59*** 
(–4.87) 
–0.30** 
(–2.34) 
–0.31** 
(–2.43) 
Constant 
 
2.84*** 
(25.9) 
1.65*** 
(10.1) 
1.64*** 
(8.71) 
Log pseudo-likelihood –1754 –1579 –1496 
Left-censored observations 
(CORR_ICRG = 0) 
4 3 3 
Right-censored observations 
(CORR_ICRG = 6) 
11 11 11 
Observations 1157 1092 1035 
1. Numbers in parentheses are z-statistics calculated using robust standard errors.   
2. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.  
3. Upper and lower bounds are 6 and 0, respectively. 
 
 
